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This paper will examine key problems facing United Kingdom police leaders in 2010 as they 
strive to meet the service expectations of government and the public in a period of austerity. 
In particular the issue of strategic discretion is examined, the extent to which the police 
leader’s opportunity to pursue strategic actions appropriate to changing circumstances, has 
been compromised by ‘mission creep’. The empirical evidence presented here is based on a 
study of one large English police service supplemented by interviews conducted with senior 
officers in this and other police services.  
 
Given our in interest in mission creep it is important to identify ‘core mission’ in respect of 
policing in the United Kingdom. Since the inception of basic ‘Peelian’ principles in the 
United Kingdom, police services have enjoyed a relatively unfettered organisational 
trajectory in terms of delivering what might be considered ‘core’ policing functions (Emsley, 
2009).  Indeed, the fundamental ‘pillars’ of what might be termed the ‘police mission’ have 
remained as a relative constant when juxtaposed with the shifting social, political and cultural 
changes which have occurred in the UK over nearly two centuries (Emsley, 1996; Bayley, 
1994; Bayley and Shearing, 2001; Reiner, 2000) Law enforcement has typically dominated 
normative explanations of what the police do and how they should be guided at a strategic 
level (Kelling & Moore 2005) On the other hand empirical evidence suggests basic policing 
roles are dominated by patrolling, traffic control and responding to the public. According to 
Bayley (2005) only a small proportion of time will be identifiable as direct crime fighting, 
with law enforcement and actual arrests being rare events for most officers. Instead a far 
greater proportion time will be given to restoring order after calls to respond to incidents and 
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providing general assistance. Around half police time will be largely concerned with officers 
‘sorting out situations’, he concludes based on empirical observations in several countries 
including England. Criminal investigation will occupy about 15% of police time. This 
involves the police talking to suspects and witnesses and collecting evidence before deciding 
on whether a prosecution is merited. Patrol and criminal investigation roles dominated in all 
the countries Bayley examined – Australia, England, Canada, Japan and the United States.  
Westley (2005) pointedly notes that the police are generally the first to be called to 
emergencies and people expect them to do something about it. In addition to law enforcement 
there is a highly significant role that involves ‘dirty work’, unpleasant and untidy but 
absolutely neccessary interventions in communities, for example dealing with drunks, the 
insane, the dead, the vice-ridden and the ill. ‘Sorting out’, crime fighting  and traffic policing 
(7% of time),  also seem to be what police officers see as the core tasks of ‘real policing’, 
mission creep implying a deviation from such a focus.   
 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the broad delivery of the ‘police mission’ has remained 
stable, in spite of being subject to various reinventions and pressures over the past fifty years 
– including community policing, zero-tolerance policing, best-value regimes, technological 
revolution and the ever changing nature of criminality itself (Jones and Newburn, 2002; 
Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; McLaughlin et al., 2001). 
 It must be noted that many (but not all) of these pressures upon the ‘police mission’ 
have tended to be incremental, increasingly testing the capacity, integrity and flexibility of 
modern policing institutions derived from the Royal Commission on the Police (1962; 
(Emsley, 1996; Garland, 1996).  However, it is during the more recent period of New Labour 
government (from 1997 to 2010) in which the ‘police mission’ has been subject to intense 
new pressures, which in turn has affected the fundamental, strategic ability of police services 
across the U.K.  From legislative frameworks for collaboration through to performance audit, 
there has been a ceaseless imposition of both core and ancillary demands from central 
Government. It is therefore to these factors which impinge upon the ‘policing mission’ to 
which the paper shall now turn.  Indeed, the aim of this paper is to provide an exploratory 
analysis of the variety of policy and legislative changes under New Labour which have 
simultaneously constrained and cajoled the basic ‘police mission’.    
Such pressures may themselves have caused the mission of the police to ‘creep’ well 
beyond the parameters of Peel’s imagination – along with causing a complexification of 
internal, organisational requirements on police resources to the extent that there are now 
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distinct limits upon the ability of command teams to co-ordinate such diverse demands into 
an effective service.  On the other hand, the research literature also points to more 
fundamental, conceptual questions around the strategic viability of modern policing 
structures to cope with their ever-creeping mission as part of the external policing 
environment (McLaughlin, 2007).  It is unclear whether the complex corpus of governmental 
dictats has simply swollen the ‘policing mission’ beyond the strategic ability of police 
services to respond adequately or rather that the current institutonal arrangements of United 
Kingdom police services, derived from the first Royal Commission, are no longer fit for 
purpose to deal with the complex policing demands, of late modern society (Garland, 2001; 
Topping, 2008). While recognising that police services are encountering something akin to 
strategic overload, we will not in this paper address the question of whether institutional 
reform needs to be undertaken to restore their capacity to think and act effectively in relation 
to policing challenges. Rather it is our intention to examine the extent to which a ‘path 
dependency’ has developed which constrains police services in their identification of 
appropriate strategic action. 
 
Background 
As a social institution within society, epitomised through the British ‘Bobby’, the police have 
managed to retain their unique political status in the United Kingdom as (relatively) 
independent arbiters of law and order (c.f. Emsley, 2009). No less in the contemporary realm, 
under the New Labour Government the centrality of the police in maintaining law and order 
has been significantly bolstered, with Government spending on police services in the United 
Kingdom having grown in real terms from £9.8bn in 1999 to £14.5bn in 2009.  Indeed, by 
2009 police numbers reached record levels with 142,151 officers, which represented a 10% 
increase in the workforce since 1998 (Mills, Silvestri, & Grimshaw, 2010). In addition, 
civilian staff numbers have also increased at a similar rate, with the ratio of police officers to 
police staff (unwarranted) decreasing from 2.3 to 1 in 2000 to 1.4 to 1 by 2009 (Meade, 
2010).   
However, in spite of the level of central Government commitment to the police 
services, there remain doubts about the capacity of police services to meet all the demands 
placed on them by their paymasters.  Such growth in police numbers has, according to police 
leaders, been accompanied by a parallel widening in the necessary strategic focus of police 
services to incorporate a range of new tasks which have also been imposed under New 
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Labour. The phenomenon was  referred to as ‘mission creep’ by Sir Hugh Orde (President of 
Association of Chief Police Officers) in an address given at the University of Ulster (2010). 
In this regard, the term refers to a strategic failure within police services due to the 
compromising of core strategic aims through the piecemeal adoption of new and secondary 
tasks. Central to this argument is evidence around the exponential increase in criminal 
legislation passed by Labour – calculated by the Liberal democrats to run at approximately 
3000 criminal offences through new or amended legislation (reference here). In this regard, it 
is clear that central government have become more controlling in the United Kingdom with 
respect to social order and the use of the police to effect those aims (Chriss, 2007; Hughes, 
2007). With such increases in policing direction from the centre, the arguments around 
‘mission creep’ can more easily be observed.  
Moving away from directed policing tasks through legislation, it is interesting to 
consider some of the indirect effects of central Government dictats upon the basic policing 
mission.  Taking for example the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, it gave the (then 
Conservative) Home Secretary a role in determining national key objectives which local 
police authorities, who oversee police services, were instructed to use in performance 
monitoring activities (Reiner, 2000). National police objectives also began to be set and 
revised on a regular basis by the Home Office.  However, it was New Labour (elected in 
1997) who continued to promote and develop such centralist, managerial reforms 
(McLaughlin et al., 2001). Police services were subject to a series of requirements associated 
with the Best Value system introduced in 2000, with Home Secretary David Blunkett 
establishing a Home Office ‘Police Standards Unit’ – which had an operational responsibility 
to increase police effectiveness and identify issues that could require new legislation.  
However, the genesis of such centralising, yet for local police services mission 
‘stretching’ tendencies had already begun under the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, which 
introduced Anti Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) – causing police services to stray from 
policing crime per se, to dealing with central social policy issues at a local level (Crawford, 
1995).  The Police Reform Act 2002 for example, placed an onus on the Secretary of State to 
produce an annual National Policing Plan (NPP), which would include strategic priorities, 
objectives and performance indicators for police services on a three year cycle.  The Act also 
introduced a new category of civilian staff, Police Community Support Officers1 (PCSOs), 
who’s impact on the ground and management within the police organisation, has at best, been 
                                                           
1
 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) These individuals were uniformed, but less expensive and less 
well trained than police officers and they lacked the full range of powers available. 
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questionable (Johnston, 2003; 2005; Crawford and Lister, 2006).  In 2004 a new suite of 
Statutory Performance Indicators (SPIs) heralded a shift from a majority of process indicators 
to a larger share of output (for example detections) and outcomes (for example surveys of 
public satisfaction) indicators (Collier, 2006). The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
2005 further established the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) on the basis of 
merging earlier national units, created to meet the challenge of national/international crime.  
Thus, it would appear that it is the cumulative and unintended effect of incremental change to 
the basic police mission which is greater than the sum of individual dictats in isolation. This 
suggested that a degree of path dependency was likely to be evident. 
When we interviewed senior police leaders it became abundantly clear that the need 
to respond operationally to new laws was both expensive in police resource terms; but also 
potentially debilitating in the respect of the maintenance of strategic direction, especially at 
the BCU (Basic Command Unit) level, where core policing roles are mostly performed. It 
also became clear during interviews that police leaders have had to respond to changes in the 
standards of the criminal justice process, such as meeting evidential quality burdens and 
creating and paying for the accompanying labour-intensive bureaucracies.  In one example, it 
was recounted by a police commander that for one case, 60,000 documents had to be 
examined as part of disclosure procedures.   
The creation of collaborative relationships has also been a keystone of the strategic 
‘stretch’ which police services have undergone since Labour. In this regard, the Government 
have relentlessly pursued a range of policies which have obliged the police to become 
involved in partnerships with other public service providers, such as the NHS, social services 
and local authorities. (Newburn, 2002). In addition to a loss of traditional command and 
control capacity by police commanders, there are also the demands on senior officer time 
which such partnerships often demand.  
Throughout the New Labour years, there have also been significant national 
requirements for police services to invest heavily in neighbourhood policing under the 
National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) (Innes, 2005); and to provide a counter-
terrorism role necessitated by post-2001 era (HM Government, 2010). Indeed, such vertical 
pressures upon police services through central Government have been compounded by 
horizontal pressures, such as health and safety/risk audit and management as part of police 
work. It was put to the research team by one police leader that the implementation of a recent 
Health and Safety Executive directive around first aid training would, if followed exactly, 
would tie up the equivalent of 200 police officer ‘years’ to meet training requirements. In this 
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regard, the rise of performance audit, the risk society and the need to respond to multiple 
audit agencies has become a costly commitment, which have further detracted from the focus 
on core policing strategic aims. (Loveday, 2000; 2006; Maguire and John, 2006) 
This point in relation to the overarching issues of ‘mission creep’ was succinctly 
captured by one senior officer, describing the situation as ‘unsustainable’ – with the service 
close to ‘breaking point’ as it tried to support it’s ‘new mission which comprises extremely 
complex 21st century problems’. Contextualising this point, it must be noted that the last 
fundamental review of policing took place in the early 1960s as a response to the 
acknowledgement that the United Kingdom was no longer a borough, or even a city-based 
society. Indeed, significant social change from the 1960s onwards, such as ‘the car and the 
M1’ (the United Kingdom’s first motorway) changed the capabilities criminals and how they 
operated (Garland, 2001). By the 2000s, crime has become a de facto global activity.  
Although when looked at objectively, in spite of such social changes, the police in the United 
Kingdom are still based upon a structure designed to tackle criminality on a county level. 
Thus, such evidence raises fundamental questions around structure of the police in the U.K to 
meet the complex demands of the twenty-first century – to which a favoured solution offered 
to the research team was a review policing and rebuild the structure of policing around larger 
service units. 
However, having explored some the contextual issues around police and ‘mission 
creep’ in the U.K, it is the intention of the paper to now examine a case study of the practical 




The data referred to in this study has been derived from annual reports presented by one large 
English police service (‘Blueshire’) between 1997 and 2009. The information extracted from 
these documents has been supplemented by interviews conducted with senior police leaders 
in two English police services. Annual reports represent the best published source for 
identifying strategic actions completed by police services over an extended period of time. 
While they are not complete records in the sense that they document every single action taken 
by a police service during the course of a year, it is reasonable to regard them as a basic 
record of the strategic course taken over time. Interviews with a small group of senior police 
leaders were conducted during July and August 2010. The researchers organised interviews 
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around the principle of conducting a  ‘grand tour’ of the subject matter, whereby subjects are 
guided towards a small number of subject destinations, but are encouraged to range freely 
across related issues in their responses to questions (Undheim, 2003). 
 
Path dependency and strategic discretion in the direction of police service  
The theory of path dependency plays a significant influence on institutionalist analysis in 
both economics and political science and has previously been applied to the case of strategic 
control over policing in the UK. (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009) Path dependency theory 
emphasises that institutional history matters in understanding how new problems are 
encountered and why strategic possibilities are identified, missed, rejected or adopted 
(Pierson, 2004). The theoretical terms used in path dependency analysis are relatively 
straightforward and readily adaptable to the problem of strategic control over policing. Path 
dependency refers to the influence that events happening at a certain point in time have on 
subsequent events. For example police services in the UK invested heavily in both capital and 
in the development of operational methods during the establishment of motorised patrols 
beginning in the mid 1950s. Up until then, a model of policing which relied on foot patrols 
and officers on bicycles had endured for over a century (Emsley, 2009).  
The adoption of the patrol car thus represents a punctuation in the policy history of 
policing. To a certain extent the punctuation had been forced on the police through the 
increasing realisation that the motor car provided the criminal with greatly enhanced 
mobility, creating a new class of problem. On the other hand, the motorised patrol would 
impact heavily on the way in which pre-existing policing challenges were dealt with. The 
assumption that police officers work in patrol or response cars would quickly become 
dominant. Alternatives were difficult to conceive of, let alone accept. It could be argued with 
some conviction that much of what passed for standard policing quickly became reliant on 
the practice of placing police officers in motorised vehicles. With the establishment of a 
motor car based patrol and response practices an option-limiting path dependency was 
created. Either new or old policy issues re-emerging in a cycle would be dealt with in terms 
which were to be found along the path.  Unless police services decided to break away from 
the path, they would continue to react to both existing and new criminal activity through a 
strategic action model which placed the patrol car in a prominent position. The practice of 
police officers patrolling and responding to calls therefore became a self-reinforcing process. 
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It became difficult to discuss policing in terms which did not include the patrol car as a key 
resource. The use of patrol cars produced positive feedback, in the sense of delivering results 
which were calculated around a range of post-patrol car policing concepts, such as speed of 
response and miles patrolled.  
On a more general level, positive feedback was provided by evidence to suggest the 
patrol and response car based police services could match the newly mobile criminal and 
bring them to justice.  A strategic developmental path had been set down which police 
services would find it difficult to ignore when, for example, the political call to adopt 
community policing strategies became prominent. ‘We will put bobbies on the beat’, meaning 
police officers will adopt foot patrol around the streets, is an extremely popular political 
offering to the UK electorate. The delivery of pedestrianised policing is not an easy task. 
‘Traditional’ policing has taken place in motor cars for 50 years and deviating from the path 
is difficult. Police leaders would find it difficult to guarantee standards if significant 
percentages of patrols and response units were removed from the motor car.    
 
Analysis 
The study identified 56 ‘strategic actions’, which were defined as the conscious 
implementation of discretionary initiatives designed to deliver stated goals. (Table 1.) Of 
these ‘strategic actions’, 32 were responses to central government policy, while the remaining 
24 were local in origin. Only seven of the strategic actions could be deemed short term, in the 
sense that the initiatives were formulated with a pre-determined timescale in mind and an exit 
point identified. For example the 2003 Annual Report of Blueshire makes reference to its 
response to the central government promoted Street Crime Initiative, which was formulated 
as short-term strategic response on the basis that a goal could be attained within a specified 
timescale and resources then moved elsewhere. Most of the strategic actions identified clearly 
involved a medium or long-term commitment of resources. For example the allocation of 
officers in 2001 to meet the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), which aimed 
to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system, is a medium or long term 






Table 1 Strategic actions taken by Blueshire 1997-2009. 
 No.  Short       Med/ 
Long   
New Cycle Path Punc. Cap. Man.    Lead Local Centr. 
1998 7 1 6 3 4 4 3 1 7 7 4 3 
1999 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
2000 4 0 4 1 2 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 
2001 7 2 5 4 2 3 2 3 7 7 1 4 
2002 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 
2003 4 1 3 1 3 3 1 1 4 4 0 5 
2004 3 0 3 1 3 2 2 0 3 3 1 1 
2005 10 0 10 2 8 8 2 2 10 10 7 3 
2006 10 2 8 0 10 10 0 0 10 10 3 7 
2007 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
2008 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 
2009 6 1 5 1 6 6 0 0 6 6 5 1 
Totals 56 7 49 16 40 44 12 10 56 56 24 32 
 
 
Interviews confirmed the perceived timescale of investment made in this particular 
area.  The study in identified 49 medium or long term strategic actions, which in effect tied 
up resources for extended periods of time, thus eliminating a certain amount of discretion on 
the part of Blueshire to respond to alternative (or necessary local) strategic goals. The nature 
of the investment made in relation to strategic actions is itself of some significance. None of 
the 56 involved solely capital investment, which is predictable in an organization which is 
delivering a principally people-based service, typically amounting to around 85% of 
expenditure. Virtually all the strategic initiatives involved both leadership and manpower, 
either in the form of police officers or civilians. Given that many of the strategic actions 
require staff to be trained or specialist recruitment, with nearly all dependent on a certain 
level of experience, it may be argued that resources are not readily ‘convertible’ for use in 
alternative tasks beyond the immediate remit of the initiative. For instance, specialist forensic 
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staff recruited to meet new standards in the presentation of evidence cannot be readily 
redeployed with any degree of immediate equivalent effectiveness in, for example, traffic 
policing. Similarly the experience built up by staff working on a business crime initiative will 
represent a specific range of skills predisposed to working with, and involving the 
commercial community.  
Only 16 of the 56 initiatives were classified as strategic actions which related to new 
issues. An example would be the response made in the form of establishing an Abusive 
Images Unit to combat child pornography, as a crime facilitated by new technology. Another 
example of a new issue prompting strategic action would be the more explicit recognition of 
hate crimes as a separate category of offence, reinforced by various legislation passed since 
1998. In response, Blueshire established 160 Hate Crime Reporting Centres in the BCU to 
enable the public to report crimes to agencies other than the police. The vast majority of 
strategic actions were in fact responses to issues which were coming around on a policy 
cycle. By this, it is meant that Blueshire would make a strategic response to an issue or 
problem which had been around for some period of time.  
Using another example, community policing has become an established issue in 
policy making terms since around the 1970s in the United Kingdom (Reiner, 2000). 
Community policing provides a classic example of how problems are not resolved and 
policies are redesigned, repackaged or just re-launched time and again. Consequently 
Blueshire was required by central government to establish Neighbourhood Policing Teams in 
2005, which represented a redesigned strategic action made to offer better community 
policing. Also in 2005, Blueshire established the Drug Intervention Programme to help break 
the link between drugs and crime by offering help to drug using offenders. This was a direct 
replacement for the Criminal Justice Intervention Programme which was the immediate 
predecessor in an enduring policy cycle. A third example is a road safety partnership 
arrangement, entered into by Blueshire with several local authorities including the Highways 
Agency (central government) and local National Health Service bodies. Traffic problems do 
not really go away and provide endless cycles of public policy.  
When examined in more detail, 44 of the strategic actions were classified as path 
dependent, with only 12 punctuations identified. Examples of path dependent strategic 
actions include a partnership initiative between Blueshire and the district general hospital, 
involving police officers being in attendance at certain times with a view to reducing violent 
crime in the hospital. This was categorised as path guided, since it was the latest action in a 
long series dealing with broadly the same issue. To make the categorisation clearer, had the 
11 
 
strategic action consisted of a Blueshire decision to fund the hire of private security guards 
then this could have counted as a departure from the path and been classified as a 
punctuation. Another example of a path guided action is Blueshires response to a central 
government initiative ‘Safer Streets’, the funding of which allowed the police to employ a 
range of existing tactics to deal with different types of robbery. An example of punctuation 
was Blueshire’s creation of an Economic Crime Unit which was tasked with the going 
through the finances of convicted criminals with a ‘fine toothed comb’ alongside criminal 
justice partner organizations. This was an action which took the criminal investigation 
strategy in a new direction and was facilitated by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  Another 
example of punctuation was the creation of Family Liaison Officer posts in 2000-1, to 
support bereaved families in the course of murder investigations. This followed a national 
inquiry into the murder of a black teenager Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent 
identification of shortcomings in the way the police liaised and supported families of victims. 
(Macpherson, 1999). 
In the absence of data describing the nature of strategic action in other public services 
it is not possible to conclude that the police are unusually path dependent in their approach to 
problems. Of some note however, was the correspondence between punctuations and issues 
which we classified as ‘new’. Out of the 12 identified punctuations 11 related to new issues. 
The only example of punctuation in strategy in response to a cyclical issue was a strategic 
action of Blueshire, which supported witnesses through a partnership with the Local Criminal 
Justice Board. It was felt that this was a new strategic direction to an old problem related to 
keeping witnesses under some degree of protection from intimidation.   
Another similarly striking finding related to the nature of strategic actions. Out of the 
56 recorded, at least 22 were dependent on partnerships with other public or private bodies. A 
further ten were firmly categorised as involving a response that was aligned with community 
policing practices. Some of these had a degree of implied partnership work involved. When 
we examined the goals associated with the 56 strategic actions, it was found that only seven 
were directly related to the core policing roles of patrol/response, criminal investigation and 
traffic issues discussed above. Two strategic actions could be deemed to boost 
patrol/response capacities; three were aimed at improving criminal investigation processes 
and one related to traffic.  
Another similarly striking finding related to the nature of strategic actions. Out of the 
56 recorded, at least 22 were dependent on partnerships with other public or private bodies. A 
further ten were firmly categorised as involving a response that was aligned with community 
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policing practices. Some of these had a degree of implied partnership work involved. The 
researchers were given access to Blueshires list of partnership based commitments, which 
currently add up to over 230. The list of senior officers involved in partnership meetings was 
extensive. Interviews indicated that a significant back office capability had to be employed in 
servicing partnerships.  Partnership responses had been set up in relation to a huge range of 
problems. For example Blueshire are partners with the UK Border Agency, District 
Authorities and police services from two neighbouring counties, housing providers and 
asylum groups. There are also a number of partnerships operating in the Youth Justice Field, 
where Blueshire will work with the local Council, an education NGO and the Council for 
Voluntary Services. Following recent incidents of child abuse, a Safeguarding Children in 
Faith Setting partnership has been created. Partnerships were frequently created to pursue 
such strategic actions, which do not correspond with traditional policing roles in the United 
Kingdom and often implied a diversionary or crime prevention role. 
 
Conclusions 
Our analysis recorded much evidence of path dependency and identifies this  a major 
source of mission creep. The reasons for this circumstance is fairly clear. At a cursory level, 
it is clear that the police service along with their policing activities, are governed by a 
complicating array of legislative and policy initiatives which have been imposed by central 
government.  Evidence would suggest that from partnerships through to performance audit, 
there has been a significant ‘widening’ of the police mission in terms of what is expected 
from a central Government perspective.  The circumstances of centralised regulation, audit 
and management may at the operational level have simultaneously ‘blinkered’ the focus of 
police command teams, forcing them to concentrate upon specific (often politically nuanced) 
‘parts’ of the police mission at the expense of what works at the local level.  Or as stated by 
one interviewee, the police have had their ‘wings clipped’ in regard to strategic flexibility and 
manoeuvrability.  
 
 It is also interesting to observe that there would appear to be an element of ‘policy 
leak’ with regard to central Government dictats, and their translation into a more narrow 
definition of police work on the ground (Crawford, 2003).  With layers of bureaucracy, 
oversight and audit, much of police’s time and effort is spent on conforming to the apparatus 
set up around individual policies, rather being allowed to interpret and deliver according to 
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local context and capacities. Transaction costs seemed excessive when we examined 
documentary evidence given to us by Blueshire. 
 Finally, the evidence would suggest that a large measure of path dependency ‘mission 
creep’ is derived from partnership/collaborative work with statutory and other agencies.  It 
was observed from the interviews that the expected levels of collaborative police working 
had gone ‘out of control’, with the regulation of collaboration causing police to spend much 
of their time ‘servicing’ the partnerships without deriving any real value in the first instance.   
 The police service in the United Kingdom is undoubtedly path dependent and in this 
new era of spending cuts, it is clear that commanders can no longer continue to juggle three 
agendas – those of local demands, national priorities and the politics of crime control 
(Hughes, 2007).  Thus, if police services are to succeed within an ever more complex 
policing environment, they must be given more maneuverability and autonomy in order to 
temper the current strategic constraints.  Path dependent responses to problems will be self-
reinforcing and in many cases will provide a degree of security to those involved, given the 
justification that tends to be associated with following historical precedent. Breaking from 
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